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Corporate governance and capital structure in developing countries: a
case study of Bangladesh   
1. Introduction
The concept of corporate governance appears to be closely related with the financing 
pattern1 of a firm. While many studies investigate the influence of corporate governance 
on financial performance, the empirical relationship between corporate governance and 
the firm’s capital structure has largely been unexplored. Several studies (for example, Du 
and Dai 2005; Kumar 2005) have analysed the relationship between corporate 
governance and debt finance, but most studies consider individual governance issues, 
such as ownership structure, rather than overall firm-level governance practices. More 
importantly, there has not been any study in the context of Bangladesh2. Even though 
debt financing is considered as an important corporate governance mechanism in 
mitigating the agency problems between shareholders and managers (Harris and Raviv 
1991), it is important to analyse the pattern of relationship between debt finance and the 
agency costs incurred between controlling and minority shareholders. In the context of 
this connection, the paper examines whether firm-level corporate governance has an 
influence on the firm’s capital structure pattern in general, and debt financing in 
particular3. 
The Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression framework uses a questionnaire-based 
Corporate Governance Index (CGI) to investigate the effect of corporate governance 
quality on capital structure of 98 non-financial listed firms in Bangladesh. The paper is 
organised as follows: section 2 reviews available literature and section 3 presents the 
research question and empirical model. Section 4 provides the empirical analysis 
1 Shleifer and Vishny (1997:737) define corporate governance as ‘the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves in getting a return on their investment’.  
2 Chowdhury (2004) investigates the determinants of debt finance, but does not take into account the governance 
issues.
3
 Note that capital structure, leverage and debt finance are used interchangeably throughout the paper.
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2
(including the data), the univariate analysis and the regression results. Section 5 analyses 
and interprets the study results and section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Literature Review 
The seminal works Fama and Miller (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) are widely 
credited with put forwarding the idea of agency theory based explanation of capital 
structure. Agency theory suggests that conflict of interests causes agency costs, which in 
turn determine the firm’s capital structure decisions (Harris and Raviv 1991). While 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) refer to two types of agency conflict in a firm (between the 
shareholders and managers and the shareholders and creditors), Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) suggest that a conflict of interests can occur between large controlling block 
holders and minority shareholders. It is argued that large investors can cause enormous 
agency problems through direct or indirect expropriation of minority shareholders as well 
as employee rights.
Corporate debt policy is commonly regarded as an important corporate governance 
mechanism in mitigating the agency conflicts between shareholders and managers. Debt 
finance can resolve agency problems through reducing free cash flow and increasing the 
probability of bankruptcy risks and job losses4. Large shareholders can also mitigate 
agency problems, since they have the incentive to collect information and monitor 
management (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
According to another line of explanation within agency theory, improved corporate 
governance and associated strong shareholder rights will reduce agency costs and 
improve the confidence of investors in a firm’s future cash flow (Gompers et al. 2003), 
and this in turn reduces the cost of equity capital to the firm (Drobetz et al. 2004). This 
4
 Jensen (1986) argues that the obligation of paying debt along with its interest reduces free cash flow and thus 
managers refrain from using the free cash for non-optimal activities. Grossman and Hart (1982, cited in Harris and 
Raviv 1991) also observe that debt finance increases the probability of costly bankruptcy and subsequent job loss, and 
thus encourages managers to work harder, consume fewer perquisites and make better investment decisions.     
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3
eventually enhances the firm’s ability to gain access to equity finance5, leading to a 
decrease in the firm’s dependence on (or preference for) debt finance. Alternatively, 
controlling owners of poorly governed firms are likely to prefer debt in order to meet 
financing needs, whilst retaining absolute ownership and control over the firm. 
Apart from corporate governance, several other firm-specific factors tend to be important 
determinants of the firm’s financing pattern. Whilst Fama and Jensen (1983, cited in Suto 
2003) argue that a large the ability of a firm to disclose greater amounts of information 
will cause lower agency costs-of-debt (e.g. positive effect on debt finance), lower 
information asymmetry between the insiders and outside shareholders of a large firm 
might have a negative effect on leverage due to the lower agency cost of equity financing 
(Rajan and Zingales 1995). Suto (2003) argues that firm size is more likely to exert a 
positive influence on debt finance in developing countries as well as in bank-based 
financial systems, since default information is less readily available in these economies. 
Kumar (2005) and Du and Dai (2005) also suggest that the relationship between firm size 
and leverage tends to be positive, mainly due to the advantage economies of scale have in 
their ability to issue long-term debt, their stronger negotiating power with the lenders and 
the opportunity for diversification and associated lower possibility of default risk. 
According to the pecking order theory of corporate finance6, profitability tends to be 
inversely related with debt finance. This is because perceived conflict of interest between 
the insiders and outside providers of funds drives a firm to favour retained earnings over 
external finance (Suto 2003). Profitability can, however, be positively associated with the 
debt finance, since creditors are likely to lend more to the firms with higher cash flows 
(Rajan and Zingales 1995). Myers (1977) and Rozeff (1982) also regard growth 
opportunity as another determinant of capital structure. A firm with higher growth 
opportunities is less likely to rely on debt finance because of the potential for bankruptcy 
5
 Several studies (e.g. LLSV 1997; Shleifer and Vishny 1997) suggest that corporate governance and associated better 
shareholder and creditor rights enhance the firm’s ability to gain access to external finance.
6 According to the pecking order theory of corporate finance, retained earnings tend to be the most favoured forms of a 
firm’s financing, followed by debt and then equity finance (Singh 2003).
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and financial distress risks (Du and Dai 2005). Nonetheless, the reluctance of controlling 
shareholders to forgo future corporate earnings, together with an insufficient cash flow to 
support the increased cost of raising equity funds, might drive growing firms to rely on 
debt rather than equity. Moreover, Suto (2003) and Du and Dai (2005) suggest that non-
debt tax deductions (e.g. depreciation and investment tax credits) are important 
substitutes for tax shield benefits of debt finance. They also suggest that asset tangibility 
(e.g. fixed assets) serves as important collateral in the debt contract and reduces the 
default risks of the lender, leading to higher debt finance. 
3. Hypothesis and M del
This paper uses the agency theory based explanation of the capital structure of a firm. It 
investigates whether firm-level corporate governance has an influence on corporate debt 
finance in a developing economy like Bangladesh. More explicitly, the paper addresses 
the following hypothesis:
H0: Corporate governance quality is inversely associated with the debt finance
The study follows, among others, Jiraporn and Gleason (2005), Singh and Faircloth 
(2005) and Kumar (2005) in using two alternative measures of capital structure, such as 
the ratio of total debt to total assets (denoted by debt-to-assets) and long term debt ratio 
(e.g. the ratio of long term debt to long term debt plus shareholder equity). Taking these 
debt financing measures as dependent variables, the following OSL regression model is 
developed: 
Capital Structure () =  + 1 (CGI) + 2 (Concentration) + 3 (Firm size) + 4 
(Profitability) + 5 (Growth) + 6 (Tangibility) + 7 (Non-debt tax 
shield) + 8 (Industry dummies) + ………………… (i)
This cross-sectional model incorporates a firm-level Corporate Governance Index 
(denoted as CGI) as the main test variable, with higher CGI specifying better governance 
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quality of a firm. Ownership concentration (e.g. measured as percentage of ownership by 
the top 10 shareholders) is also used as an additional governance variable, not been 
incorporated in the index. As mentioned above, the CGI and concentration variables are 
predicted to have negative and positive signs, respectively.
Based on the review of literature on the determinants of capital structure, several firm 
characteristics are used as control variables. These include firm size (measured as the 
natural logarithm of assets), profitability or return on assets (the ratio of net income after 
taxes to total assets), growth (a three- or five-year average asset growth rate), asset 
tangibility (fixed assets-to-total assets), non-debt tax shield (the ratio of depreciation and 
amortisation to total assets) and the industry dummies based on 4-digit SIC codes.
One important caveat of the study is that it is unable to address the issues of endogeneity 
and reverse causality7, primarily because of the absence of time variation in governance 
and financial data, along with the problem of finding appropriate instrumental variable 
for the simultaneous regression approach. This remains a shortcoming in the empirical 
study. Nevertheless, This problem can be mitigated by incorporating several firm specific 
characteristics as control variables, including the industry dummies8.
4. Empirical Analysis 
This section explains the data including the CGI, followed by a summary statistics and 
univariate analysis, and the regression results. 
4.1. The Data
7
 Black et al. (2005) explain two different perspectives of firm level endogeneity: reverse causality and signaling effect. 
Reverse causality refers to the notion that firms with better financial performance prefer to adopt best practices of 
governance rather than vice-versa, whereas signaling effect explains that firms adopt better governance practices to 
signal high quality.
8
 Among others, Klapper and Love (2004) and Drobetz et al. (2004) argue that adding appropriate control variables can 
be one way to mitigate the problem of omitted variables, endogeneity or reverse causality.
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The study uses corporate governance data based on a questionnaire survey carried out in 
2004-2005. Amongst the 186 non-financial listed firms of the prime exchange of 
Bangladesh, the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE), 101 firms responded to the survey, with 
the response rate being around 55 percent. The sample firms capture nearly 96 per cent of 
the total market capitalisation (MC) of all non-financial firms, and 45 percent MC of the 
DSE9. The financial data on debt finance and other firm characteristics were collected 
from the annual reports of the sample firms, together with the monthly reviews of the 
DSE. 
Corporate Governance Index
In order to quantify the firm-specific governance quality, a Corporate Governance Index 
(CGI) is constructed, consisting of five individual governance components10; namely, the 
ownership pattern (sub-index 1), shareholders’ rights (sub-index 2), independence and 
responsibilities of the board and management (sub-index 3), financial reporting and 
disclosures (sub-index 4) and responsibility towards the stakeholders (sub-index 5). The 
method follows several studies (such as Black et al. 2003; Klapper and Love 2002) to 
construct a CGI, although many of the governance elements have been modified in order 
to make the index compatible with the legal and regulatory issues in Bangladesh11. 
***Insert Table 1 about here***
The distribution of CGI of 101 non-financial firms in Bangladesh (presented in table 1) 
reveals that the mean (median) value of the CGI is 40.84 (41.67), and the standard 
9
 The financial sector appears to dominate the market behavior of the DSE, with nearly 52 per cent (including banking 
firms with 47 per cent) of the total market capitalisation, and 53 per cent of the total turnover (DSE Review Dec. 2004).
10 A sub-index is constructed by summing up the values of all variables (between 1 and 0, with 1 being the compliance 
with better governance, and 0 otherwise) within that index, which is divided by the number of ‘non-missing’ variables. 
The ratio is then multiplied by 20 to have the sub-index value between 0 and 20. The overall CGI is finally constructed 
by adding up the values of all five sub-indices, and it carries a value between 0 and 100, with higher index scores 
denoting the better governed firms.
11 Note that the firm-specific scoring of the corporate governance practices in Bangladesh might not be comparable to 
international governance ratings. Given the persistent inefficiency in the legal and enforcement structures, the study is 
intended to measure the relative voluntary activism and/or legal compliance of the firm in corporate governance 
matters. 
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deviation is 21.23. The standard deviation of the CGI is relatively higher, implying that 
the governance scores of many firms do not seem to be closer to the average governance 
index. This distribution is likely to be resulted from a widespread difference in 
governance qualities among the sample firms in various categories (such as foreign vs. 
local). Even so, nearly 50 percent of the sample firms appear to have CGI between 33 and 
53. 
***Insert Table 2 about here*** 
The correlation matrix of the sample firm presented in table 2 shows that all correlation 
coefficients amongst the CGI and its five sub-indices are positive, and all are statistically 
significant. Even though many individual elements of the sub-indices have been 
eliminated because of their perceived substitution or overlapping responses, the 
correlation coefficients among some sub-indices still remain reasonably high. This is 
likely to be because firms with better governance quality become visible by 
demonstrating their superiority in almost all categories that constitute the sub-indices. 
Moreover, the adoption of better practices in all governance areas appears to be 
considered as complementary by some foreign and local reputed firms. 
4.2. Summary Statistics and Univariate Analysis
This sub-section describes the capital structure pattern of the non-financial firms in 
Bangladesh, alongside the univariate relationships between corporate governance 
variables and several alternative measures of debt finance. 
 ***Insert Table 3 about here***
Column 1 of table 3 shows that the mean values of debt-asset ratio (Lvg.-1) and debt-
equity ratio (Lvg.-2) are 0.70 and 1.93, respectively, implying that the sample firms have 
higher proportion of debt in relation to equity. Altogether, it is evidenced that the non-
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8
financial firms in Bangladesh tend to have high degree of reliance on short-term bank 
debt rather than equity finance or long-term debt. 
Following Gompers et al., (2003), governance scores are used to construct two extreme 
portfolios such as ‘repressive portfolio’ (i.e. firms with poor governance quality, with 
CGI < 35) and ‘moderate portfolio’ (i.e. better governed firms, with CGI > 48). Both 
portfolios represent roughly the upper (33 firms) and lower (34 firms) third of the sample. 
Irrespective of debt financing measures, poorly governed (e.g. repressive portfolio) firms 
are found to have reasonably higher financial leverage than the firms in moderate 
portfolio, and the differences in Lvg.-1 (e.g. debt-to-assets) and Lvg.-3 (ratio long-term 
debt to long-term debt plus shareholders equity) are statistically significant. 
Table 3 also reveals the degree of univariate relationships among several measures of 
debt finance and corporate governance indices. Columns 5 through 10 depict that all four 
debt financing measures are negatively correlated with the CGI and each of the five 
governance sub-indices. Most of the governance indices are also found to have 
statistically significant relationships with debt-to-assets and debt-to-equity. 
4.3. The Regression Results 
This sub-section presents the empirical results of the OLS regression model of the 
relationship between corporate governance and debt finance. Column 1 of table 4 depicts 
the regression result of debt-to-assets (e.g. the ratio of total debt to total assets) with CGI 
as the main explanatory variable, coupled with several control variables such as firm size, 
profitability, historical growth, asset tangibility and non-debt tax shield. It is shown that 
the regression coefficient of the CGI is significant and negative as expected. Both firm 
size and growth proxies are found to have statistically significant positive coefficients. 
Moreover, the regression sign of firm profitability is negative and significant. 
***Insert Table 4 about here***
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9
In column 2, the new ownership concentration variable enters with the expected positive 
sign, which is statistically significant. The regression signs of the other explanatory 
variables remain identical, with only CGI, firm size, profitability and growth having 
significant results. The industry-adjusted results in column 3 reveal that the regression 
signs and the levels of significance of all explanatory variables remain unchanged12. 
Replacing debt-to-assets with long term debt ratio (e.g. the ratio of long term debt to long 
term debt plus shareholders’ equity) as the dependent variable, the similar specification is 
estimated. Column 4 of table 4 shows that the regression of long term debt ratio has not 
brought any change in the regression signs. However, only the CGI, firm size and 
profitability remain statistically significant. 
The adjusted R2 value of the regression of long-term debt ratio is around 0.720, which is 
increased to around 0.850 for the specification of debt-to-assets.  The R2 values suggest 
that the model’s explanatory power in estimating the variability in debt finance is 
reasonably high, which provides a better overall fit for the population. In addition, higher 
level of significance of the F-statistics suggests an improved explanatory power of the 
regressor variables. 
5. Analysis and Interpretation of the Results
The study results appear to corroborate the prediction of the agency theory that poor 
corporate governance and associated weak shareholder rights are linked with higher debt 
finance. The study thus supports the findings of Jiraporn and Gleason (2005), whereby 
firms with poor shareholder rights favour higher debt ratio. However, this inverse 
relationship is unlikely to be a consequence of the role of debt in mitigating agency 
problems (Jensen and Meckling 1976), rather it is an outcome of controlling 
12
 Note that the regression specification of column 3 is estimated by substituting the CGI with each of the five 
governance sub-indices, which is not shown in the paper. The regression results suggest that all five sub-indices are 
negatively associated with the debt ratio, and all but the ownership sub-index coefficient is statistically significant.
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shareholders’ intention to retain ownership and control over the firm13. Although 
conflicts of interest between owners and managers persist, the latter do not seem to exert 
reasonable power and influence to cause higher agency costs, since the former have the 
incentive and authority to collect information and monitor management (see, Jensen and 
Meckling 1976).
The capital structure pattern in many developing economies like Bangladesh seems to 
suffer most from the agency problems created by the founding family or controlling 
shareholders, as suggested in several studies (for example, Shleifer and Vishny 1997; 
Chen and Hu 2007). The controlling shareholders of poorly governed family-controlled 
firms tend to exert direct or indirect influence in the firm’s financing decisions, as this is 
in their own interest, and this results in reduced rights for minority shareholder. These 
controlling shareholders want to preserve authority and informational advantage by 
choosing readily available bank debt toward meeting the firm’s financing needs, whilst 
retaining or increasing ownership or control. This observation is supported by the 
evidence of positive association between ownership concentration and financial leverage. 
Amongst the other determinants of capital structure, the regression results of profitability 
and firm size proxies are found to be significant and consistent. Evidence of a negative 
effect of profitability on debt ratio confirms the prediction of the pecking order theory, 
that firms will favour retained earnings over external finance. The positive influence of 
firm size on leverage also supports the theoretical prediction that large firms have an 
advantage over the smaller firms in obtaining long-term as well as short-term bank loans 
as they have the economies of scale, such as the opportunity for diversification and the 
ability to disclose more information (Du and Dai 2005; Fama and Jensen 1983). 
Nonetheless, the corporate governance index, being the main test variable, is proved to be 
robust in all alternative specifications, even after controlling for firm-specific variables. 
This corroborates the hypothesised negative influence of firm-level corporate governance 
13 Alternatively, better corporate governance reduces agency cost of equity, which in turn enhances the firm’s ability to 
raise equity finance and reduces the firm’s reliance on debt.
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on debt finance. The robustness of the empirical effect of governance quality (e.g. CGI) 
is also supported by the regression results whereby each of the five sub-indices has an 
inverse effect on financial leverage. The results appear to have important contribution to 
the existing literature on corporate governance and corporate finance in the context of 
bank-based financial systems in developing economies. On the one hand, the study 
confirms a significant negative influence of better governance quality on the firm’s 
reliance on bank debt; Iturriaga (2005) also finds that disclosure requirements have a 
negative influence on the bank debt of smaller firms. On the other hand, the study 
suggests that controlling shareholders of poorly governed firms use increased bank debt 
in meeting a firm’s financing needs without sacrificing their ownership and control. 
In the absence of a noticeable bond market in the country14, firms raise their debt finance 
mainly from the nationalised and private commercial banks. The greater negotiating 
power of controlling shareholders, along with their strong political ties and business 
relationships, appears to be the main reason the higher level of bank debt for poorly 
governed firms. Whilst this observation supports the findings of Semenov (2006), that 
close bank-firm relationships improve a firm’s access to external (bank) finance, it 
contradicts the proposition that such relationships reduce capital market imperfections, 
especially in relation to a developing country like Bangladesh. This is because the crony 
relationship can help opportunistic businesspeople to get bank loans without improving 
the firm’s governance practices. This eventually undermines the rights of both 
shareholders and depositors, leading to an imperfect capital market.
The banks (or debt finance) are therefore unable to mitigate the agency problems. Instead 
of serving the interests of depositors through proper vigilance and monitoring, the debt 
providers seem to become a part of the corrupted default system that serves the mutual 
interests of several parties, such as controlling shareholders of poorly governed firms, 
controlling owners of banks, ill-motivated bank managers of nationalised and private 
14
 Also, the country’s stock market, with its small size (the ratios of market capitalisation to GDP in 2003 and 2004 
were around 2.42 percent and 4.11 percent) does not seem to have any significant contribution to the firm’s financing.
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banks and political leaders or bureaucrats with close relationships with the controlling 
shareholders of the borrowing and lending firms. 
In these circumstances, agency problems may arise, not only between the debt providers 
and minority shareholders of the borrowing firms, but also between the depositors and 
controlling owners of the lending firms (e.g. banks). This evidence supports the 
observation of Caprio and Levine (2002) that a large creditor is unlikely to be 
independent if he is directly or indirectly associated with the controlling family. It is 
important to mention that the creditors’ rights in Bangladesh remain very weak because 
of incomplete and inconsistent Bankruptcy Acts, along with the ineffectiveness of the 
bankruptcy courts and money loan courts15, which in turn is the result of strong political 
lobbying of a group of business elites. Whilst Iturriaga (2005) finds better protection of 
creditor rights has a positive influence on bank debt in developed economies, this 
proposition may not hold true for a developing economy, where poor creditor rights can 
cause a higher level of bank debt.
Bank-based debt finance may not only help poorly governed firms meet their financing 
needs without diluting the control of majority owners, but may also allow the latter to 
expropriate the interests of the minority shareholders and other stakeholders. The study 
also corroborates other empirical studies based on developing economies. Kumar (2005), 
for instance, observes that debt can facilitate expropriation in economies like India, where 
institutions are generally ineffective. Du and Dai (2005) also argue that weak corporate 
governance and crony capitalism in East Asian economies have caused risky capital 
structures, leading to financial distress risks.  
6. Conclusions 
The paper empirically examines the relationship between firm-level corporate 
governance and the capital structure pattern of non-financial listed firms in Bangladesh. 
15 See also Sobhan and Werner (2003).
Page 13 of 17
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
13
With a survey-based corporate governance index (CGI), the study investigates the effect 
of corporate governance on the total as well as long-term debt ratios. The cross-sectional 
regressions appear to confirm a significant influence of firm-level governance quality on 
a firm’s capital structure, with the poorly governed firms having higher level of debt 
finance. The paper suggests that an inverse relationship between corporate governance 
and debt ratio is less likely to be a consequence of the role of debt in mitigating agency 
problems, and more likely to be an outcome of the controlling shareholders’ reluctance to 
forgo absolute control rights. This is probably because controlling shareholders of a 
poorly governed firm intend to preserve their authority and informational advantage by 
choosing readily available bank debt, whist retaining their ownership or control of the 
firm. This notion is also supported by the evidence that ownership concentration is 
positively associated with the debt ratio. In this situation, debt providers appear to 
become a part of the crony relationships of powerful stakeholders, who capitalise on 
inefficient institutional framework to persistently cause poor firm-level governance.   
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Table 1: Mean values of corporate governance index across industries  
Sectors CGIndex
Owner-
ship
Sharehol
ders’ 
Right
Board &
Manage
ment.
Disclo-
ure
Stakehol
ders’ 
Rights
n
Food & Allied 38.45 10.00 7.78 6.22 6.67 7.78 12
Tobacco 46.22 10.00 11.11 8.44 6.67 10.00 3
Textile 36.50 4.64 8.69 4.95 8.81 9.40 28
Chemical & Allied 48.24 8.33 10.00 7.04 10.65 12.22 18
Leather & Leather Products 50.84 10.00 12.51 6.67 10.00 11.67 4
Ceramic & Cement 39.56 6.15 10.52 6.87 7.82 8.20 13
Machinery & Equipment 30.92 2.50 7.51 4.67 7.92 8.34 4
Electrical Equipments & Comp. 51.72 8.33 11.67 7.56 11.39 12.77 6
Automobile 48.01 0.00 13.34 8.00 11.67 15.00 2
Other Manufacturing 19.34 10.00 2.23 2.67 3.33 1.11 3
Business (IT) Services 37.33 7.50 9.17 4.00 8.33 8.33 4
Real Estate & Other Services 44.83 0.00 10.00 5.67 11.67 17.50 4
Foreign Controlled Firms 79.29 19.00 15.67 14.80 13.83 16.00 10
Locally Controlled Firms 36.61 5.27 8.68 5.05 8.30 9.30 91
Total 40.84 6.63 9.38 6.02 8.84 9.97 101
Source: Prepared by the authors based on questionnaire survey conducted in 2004-05.
Table 2: Correlation matrix for corporate governance index and sub-indices 
Categories CGI (Sub-index-1)
(Sub-
index-2)
(Sub-
index-3)
(Sub-
index-4)
(Sub-
index-5)
Ownership
(Sub-index-1) 0.471*** 1
Shareholders Rights 
(Sub-index-2) 0.864*** 0.204** 1
Board
(Sub-index-3) 0.749*** 0.343*** 0.628*** 1
Disclosure
(Sub-index-4) 0.835*** 0.194** 0.742*** 0.565*** 1
Stakeholders Rights
(Sub-index-5) 0.826*** 0.074 0.740*** 0.505*** 0.816*** 1
Note: The correlation matrix is based on 101 non-financial listed firms. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3: Corporate governance and various measures of debt finance
Mean Ratios Correlation with CGI and Sub-indices
All REP. MOD. Difference (t-stat.) CGI Sub-1 Sub-2 Sub-3 Sub-4 Sub-5 Leve-
rage 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Lvg1 0.70 1.02 0.50 0.52*** -0.33*** -0.17** -0.34*** -0.04 -0.40*** -0.31***
Lvg2 1.93 2.56 1.28 1.28 -0.20** -0.20** -0.17** -0.11 -0.15* -0.12
Lvg3 0.32 0.43 0.18 0.25** -0.12 -0.01 -0.12 -0.14* -0.13* -0.10
Lvg4 0.44 0.58 0.30 0.27 -0.08 -0.07 -0.02 -0.09 -0.07 -0.05
n 101 34 33 101 101 101 101 101 101
Notes: The table is based on primary data on non-financial listed firms in Bangladesh. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 
1 per cent levels, respectively. Firms with the CGI of less than 35 are placed in the repressive portfolio (denoted as REP.), whilst the 
moderate portfolio (MOD.) consists of the firms with the CGI of greater than 48. Column 4 shows the difference (t-statistics) in the 
means of alternative leverage measures between the two portfolios. Lvg.1 = Total debt -to- Total assets, Lvg.2 = Total debt -to-
Shareholders’ equity, Lvg.3 = Long term debt -to- Long term debt plus Shareholders’ equity, Lvg.4 = Long term debt -to-
Shareholders’ equity
Table 4: The OLS regression results of debt ratios against corporate governance index (CGI) and 
ownership concentration
Dep.Var. Debt-to-Assets Long Term Debt Ratio
Expl. Var. 1 2 3 4 5 6
Intercept 0.014(0.161)
-0.156
(0.157)
-0.224
(0.210)
-0.402**
(0.175)
-0.487**
(0.191)
-0.412*
(0.249)
CGI -0.004***(0.001)
-0.004***
(0.001)
-0.004***
(0.002)
-0.003**
(0.002)
-0.003**
(0.002)
-0.002*
(0.002)
Concentration 0.003**(0.001)
0.004***
(0.001)
0.002
(0.002)
0.003*
(0.002)
Firm Size 0.060***(0.012)
0.060***
(0.011)
0.048***
(0.010)
0.059***
(0.016)
0.057***
(0.016)
0.047**
(0.019)
Profitability  -0.165***(0.040)
-0.188***
(0.040)
-0.197***
(0.048)
-0.230***
(0.040)
-0.224***
(0.041)
-0.305***
(0.044)
Growth 0.188***(0.058)
0.169***
(0.063)
0.143**
(0.063)
0.033
(0.080)
0.027
(0.074)
0.038
(0.078)
Tangibility -0.111(0.086)
-0.099
(0.085)
-0.059
(0.101)
0.123
(0.093)
0.125
(0.094)
0.135
(0.110)
Non-debt Tax Shield -0.118(0.100)
-0.104
(0.099)
-0.208*
(0.109)
-0.180
(0.146)
-0.169
(0.143)
-0.263*
(0.146)
Industry Dummies - - Yes - - Yes
F-statistics 71.63*** 64.85*** 30.59*** 35.07*** 30.93*** 14.481***
Adjusted R2 0.836 0.840 0.853 0.719 0.720 0.734
N. of Observations 98 98 98 94 94 94
Notes: The OSL regressions are based on non-financial listed firms after dropping the observations that are identified as extreme 
outliers. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively. The figures in parentheses are the 
heteroscedasticity-adjusted standard errors. Few more observations are found to be outliers in the cross-section regression models. The 
problem of outliers has been treated by adding a dummy variable for the outliers in the regression model. The regression coefficients 
of the outlier dummy are turned out to be statistically significant at one percent level in all specifications.
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